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ABSTRACT 
People often falsely recognize items that are similar to previously encountered 
items. This robust memory error is referred to as gist-based false recognition. A widely 
held view is that this error occurs because the details fade rapidly from our memory. 
Contrary to this view, an initial experiment revealed that, following the same encoding 
conditions that produce high rates of gist-based false recognition, participants 
overwhelmingly chose the correct target rather than its related foil when given the option 
to do so. A second experiment showed that this result is due to increased access to stored 
details provided by reinstatement of the originally encoded photograph, rather than to 
increased attention to the details. Collectively, these results suggest that details needed 
for accurate recognition are, to a large extent, still stored in memory and that a critical 
factor determining whether false recognition will occur is whether these details can be 
accessed during retrieval. False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   3 
INTRODUCTION 
Human memory is not a literal reproduction of the past, like a photograph or film, 
but rather a constructed representation of past experience that is influenced by a variety 
of factors related to the originally encoded event, including general knowledge, personal 
biases, information from other events, and inferences (Bartlett, 1932; Johnson, 1997; 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Loftus, 1979, 2003; Roediger, 1996; Schacter, 
Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998). These constructive processes presumably lead to 
functionally beneficial representations of the past, but they also cause memory to be 
prone to error (Schacter, 1999, 2001) The mistaken recognition of an item that is similar, 
but not identical, to a previously encountered item is a ubiquitous and robust memory 
error referred to as gist-based false recognition (Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; cf., Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995). For instance, people tend to mistakenly recognize a word that is a 
synonym of a studied word (Anisfeld & Knapp, 1968), an abstract shape that is 
structurally similar to studied shapes (Koutstaal, Schacter, Verfaellie, Brenner, & 
Jackson, 1999; Slotnick & Schacter, 2004), or a pictured object that has the same verbal 
label as a studied item (Koutstaal, 2006). In these cases, people fail to remember the 
specific details of an event but can remember more abstracted information — the “gist” 
— such as the superordinate category of an encountered object. 
  One possibility is that these errors occur because the original details have been 
lost from memory, either because they were not encoded originally or because the 
memory trace has degraded over time. Then, at retrieval, the system relies on more 
abstract information to reconstruct the lost details. This line of thinking has been implicit 
in much of the literature. For instance, in the Constructive Memory Framework put False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   4 
forward by Schacter et al. (1998), it was proposed that gist-based false recognition results 
primarily from a failure of pattern separation, a process that occurs during encoding. 
Thus, according to this proposal, gist-based false recognition occurs in large part because 
the details were not adequately encoded in the first place. Brainerd and Reyna’s (2002) 
Fuzzy Trace Theory proposed that verbatim details are forgotten more rapidly than gist 
information, a combination that contributes to gist-based false recognition (see also 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). 
  However, it is also known that people can store an impressive amount of 
information, particularly about recently encountered pictures or objects. For example, 
Standing (1973) demonstrated that people could recognize thousands of experimentally 
presented pictures. More recently, Brady et al. (2008) had participants study 2,896 
pictures of objects shown for 3 s each. In a forced-choice test, participants were asked to 
make subtle distinctions based on memory: the foil was the same object as the studied 
item, but in a slightly different state (e.g., a bread box with the loaf of bread inside the 
box or outside the box). Participants scored 87% correct in this condition, suggesting that 
people can store a large amount of detailed information about recently encountered 
objects (see also Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010). 
These findings present a puzzle. On the one hand, a large body of data on false 
recognition suggests that the detail stored in episodic memory is limited and that memory 
relies heavily on constructive processes to compensate for this limitation. On the other 
hand, the findings concerning highly specific recognition of visual objects suggest that 
the level of detail stored in episodic memory is far greater than what would have been False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   5 
expected on the basis of the false recognition findings. Here we attempt to reconcile these 
seemingly contradictory results. 
We suggest that, even when rates of false recognition are high, people do retain 
many details, but do not adequately utilize them at retrieval. In two experiments, we 
explored the hypothesis that high rates of false recognition occur when people do not 
attend to or do not retrieve the relevant perceptual details. To this end, we developed an 
experimental paradigm that encouraged participants to focus on the relevant perceptual 
details. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Rationale and Design 
The conditions of the memory test are depicted in Figure 1. On each trial, the 
participant was presented with three pictures. Two of the pictures were related to one 
another because they were both exemplars of the same category and shared a common 
verbal label. It is important to note that the conditions did not differ systematically in 
terms of their perceptual presentation; they differed only in terms of the content of the 
participant’s memory. The participant’s task was to select one of the items as studied or 
reject all three items as new (“all new”). In the baseline target condition, one of the 
pictures was a target (studied item) and the other two items were not systematically 
related to any of the studied items. In the baseline lure condition, all three items were not 
systematically related to any of the studied items and the correct response was “all new”. 
In the single related item condition, one of the pictures was related to a studied item. The 
other two items were not systematically related to any of the studied items. The correct False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   6 
response was “all new”, but we anticipated that participants would falsely recognize the 
related item with high frequency, reflecting a standard gist-based false recognition effect. 
In the target and related item condition, the target was presented adjacent to the related 
item. The third item was not systematically related to any of the studied items. In this 
condition, the nature of the discrimination required was made explicit to the participant. 
Both the target and the related lure were likely to seem familiar, thus requiring that the 
participant systematically compared the target and related lure and identified features that 
distinguished them. If gist-based false recognition occurs because people fail to attend to 
or retrieve relevant perceptual details still stored in memory, then false recognition rates 
should be substantially reduced in this condition. 
Participants 
  32 college students (15 male, ages 18-29, mean 22) from the Boston metropolitan 
area served as participants and were paid $70 (participants were scanned with functional 
MRI during the experiment; the imaging data will be presented in a separate report). 
Candidates were excluded for participation that did not meet standard MRI safety criteria, 
required glasses to see normally, had strabismus or a history of eye surgery, or that were 
left handed. All participants provided informed consent as approved by the Institutional 
Review Board at Harvard University. Nine participants were replaced: 4 for poor 
performance (hits minus false alarms less than .30); 3 for eye tracking problems; 2 for 
anatomical abnormalities. 
Stimulus Materials 
  384 pairs of object photographs or detailed, colored drawings served as stimuli 
(Koutstaal, 2006; Koutstaal, et al., 2001). The items within a pair were related to each False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   7 
other because they were both exemplars of the same category and shared a common 
verbal label (e.g., wrench, dog, tree). However, the two pictures were perceptually 
distinct exemplars of the category and, at a minimum, differed in terms of color or 
orientation. Stimuli were fully counterbalanced (Supplementary Methods). 
Procedure 
  Participants were told that their memory would be tested later and were presented 
with 144 objects (500 ms duration, 1500 ms ISI) and indicated whether the pictured 
object could fit into a 13 inch box in the real world by a button press. A box measuring 
approximately 13 inches was presented. The participant was given a self-paced break 
halfway through the study session. Then the participant was placed in an MRI scanner. 
The occurrence of similar foils was clearly explained to the participant. The test was 
divided into four blocks; each began with 15 s of fixation and ended with 10 s of fixation 
and contained 12 trials of each condition. Each trial lasted 5 s. With the constraint that the 
two related items were next to each other, there were four possible arrangements of the 
pictures; each occurred equally often within each block. 24 fixation trials, also lasting 5 s, 
were randomly intermixed within each block. 
Results 
Accuracy 
The accuracy data are shown in Figure 2 (reaction times are reported in 
Supplementary Table 1). Within the baseline target condition, the hit rate was 
reasonably high (.76, SEM = .02, green bar). Within the baseline foil condition, the 
correct rejection rate was reasonably high (.69, SEM = .03, blue bar). Therefore, 
participants performed the task well. False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   8 
In the single related item condition, participants incorrectly selected the related 
item at a high rate (.41, SEM = .02, yellow bar). This false alarm rate was approximately 
four times larger than the baseline false alarm rate to items not presented in a pair, such 
as the apple in Figure 1 [.11, SEM = .01, orange bar, t(31) = 18.74, p < .001]. As we 
expected, there was a robust gist-based false recognition effect in the single related item 
condition. 
In the target and related item condition, the false alarm rate to related foils 
dropped substantially (.12, SEM = .01, yellow bar), corresponding to a 71% reduction in 
the rate of gist-based false recognition [t(31) = 14.97, p < .001]. Nonetheless, within the 
target and related item condition, false alarm rates to related foils were higher than false 
alarm rates to unrelated foils [.04, SEM = .01, orange bar, t(31) = 7.77, p < .001]. Thus, 
gist-based false recognition was dramatically reduced but not entirely eliminated. 
Eye Tracking 
  To verify that participants systematically compared the target and related foil in 
the target and related foil condition, we calculated the number of saccades between 
similar pictures per trial. These data are presented in Figure 3. There were more saccades 
between related pictures in the target and related item condition (2.80, SEM = 0.13, green 
bar) than the baseline target condition [1.53, SEM = 0.09, green bar, t(31) = 18.79, p < 
.001]. 
Discussion 
Under the same encoding conditions that produced high rates of gist-based false 
recognition in the single related item condition, participants overwhelmingly chose the 
correct target in favor of its related foil when given the option to do so. This finding False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   9 
indicates that the details distinguishing the target from its related foil were, to a large 
extent, still retained in memory. Hence, gist-based false recognition is not produced by a 
loss of detail per se. Rather, gist-based false recognition is attributable, at least in part, to 
a failure to retrieve stored details. 
  One explanation for our data is that the retrieval failure contributing to gist-based 
false recognition resulted primarily from a suboptimal deployment of attention: in the 
single related foil condition, the participant failed to attend to the relevant details; in the 
target and related foil condition, the participant’s attention was drawn to the features that 
are relevant to the discrimination. However, another critical property distinguishes these 
conditions: in the target and related item condition, the originally encoded picture is 
presented at retrieval. In line with the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973), we would expect that this reinstatement of the originally encoded 
information led to increased access to the memory trace. There are thus two distinct 
mechanisms that could have contributed to the reduction in false recognition observed in 
Experiment 1: (i) attention to detail and (ii) reinstatement of detail. In Experiment 2, we 
attempted to tease apart these two mechanisms. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
  In order to distinguish between the effects of attention and reinstatement, we 
repeated Experiment 1 with the inclusion of a critical new condition. In the two related 
items condition (Figure 4), the participant was presented with two items, both of which 
were related to the same study item. The third item in the array was not systematically 
related to any of the studied items. Both of the related items should seem familiar and the False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   10 
participant should therefore systematically compare the two related items. Thus, in this 
condition the participant’s attention is drawn to the features that, on average, distinguish 
exemplars of the category. Critically, however, the originally encoded photograph is not 
presented. 
  The methods were identical to those of Experiment 1 except as noted. 30 
participants (17 male; ages 18-27, mean 20) were run. Data from 10 participants were 
replaced: 2 due to movement and 1 due to an anatomical abnormality; 2 for low 
performance (hit minus false alarm rate less than .30); 4 because they did not produce 
sufficient gist-based false alarms (at least .25) to enable MRI analysis (note that their 
inclusion would not alter our conclusions); 1 because he had an unusually low hit rate in 
the target and related items condition (.30). A new set of 400 object triplets was 
generated using high quality colored photographs. Participants studied 160 objects, and 
the memory test was divided into five blocks. Eight trials of each condition occurred in 
each block. 40 fixation trials occurred in each block. 
  A parallel experiment was run outside of the MRI environment in order to collect 
confidence ratings (Supplementary Materials).  
Results 
  The results of Experiment 2 closely replicated Experiment 1. Below, we focus on 
the novel findings of Experiment 2. 
Accuracy 
The accuracy data are presented in Figure 5 (reaction time data are presented in 
Supplementary Table 2). The critical question concerns the gist-based false recognition 
rate in the two related items condition, where participants attended to the relevant details False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   11 
but did not benefit from reinstatement of the originally encoded photograph. There was 
no evidence of a reduction in false recognition to related foils in this condition. In fact, 
the false alarm rate to related foils was larger in the two related items condition (.47, 
SEM = .02, yellow bar) than in the single related item condition [.38, SEM = .02, yellow 
bar, t(29) = 3.51, p = .001]. This result could reflect differences in baseline false alarm 
rates to foils occurring in pairs and foils not occurring in pairs. Even within the baseline 
foil condition, the false alarm rate to foils occurring in pairs was larger (.13, SEM = .02, 
blue bar) than to foils not occurring in pairs [.08, SEM = .01, orange bar, t(29) = 2.88, p < 
.01]. When the false alarm rates to related items were corrected by subtracting the 
appropriate baseline false alarm rates, there was not a significant difference in false alarm 
rates to related items in the two related items condition (.33, SEM = .02) and the single 
related item condition [.30, SEM = .02, t(29) = 1.38, p = .18].  
Eye Tracking 
The average number of saccades between related pictures is shown in Figure 6. 
This measure was larger in the two related items condition (2.98, SEM = 0.11, yellow 
bar) than in the single related item condition [1.56, SEM = 0.09, yellow bar, t(29) = 
13.76, p < .001]. These data confirm that participants were directly comparing the two 
related items in the two related items condition. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 differentiated between two mechanisms that could have contributed 
to the reduction in rates of gist-based false recognition observed in Experiment 1: (i) 
attention to detail and (ii) reinstatement of detail. In the two related items condition, 
participants actively attended to the details that, on average, distinguished between False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   12 
exemplars of the category. Nonetheless, there was no evidence of a reduction in gist-
based false recognition rates. In contrast, in the target and related item condition — 
where participants had the added benefit of having the originally encoded photograph 
presented again at retrieval — there was a dramatic reduction in rates of gist-based false 
recognition, replicating Experiment 1. These results suggest that the outcome of 
Experiment 1 depended primarily on reinstatement of the studied picture and that 
increased attention to detail is not sufficient to reduce rates of gist-based false 
recognition. 
One caveat is that the target and related item condition and the two related items 
condition may have differed in how effectively they drew the participant’s attention to 
specific diagnostic features. For instance, if the target is a red car and both related 
exemplars are blue cars, then the exemplars will not differ in terms of color in the two 
related items condition and the participant’s attention will not be directed towards color. 
Nonetheless, the two related items condition does draw the participant’s attention to the 
features that, on average, distinguish exemplars of a category. Therefore, if attention to 
detail were sufficient to reduce gist-based false recognition, then we would expect some 
reduction in gist-based false recognition, but we saw no evidence of such a reduction. 
It is critical to note that the aforementioned caveat has no bearing on the broader 
and more significant conclusion that gist-based false recognition results from retrieval 
failure. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We investigated the hypothesis that gist-based false recognition does not result 
from a loss of detail from memory per se, but rather from inadequate utilization of stored False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   13 
detail during retrieval. Experiment 1 investigated the possibility that people do not attend 
to the relevant details. In the critical condition of Experiment 1, there was a dramatic 
reduction in gist-based false recognition. Under the same encoding conditions that 
produced large rates of gist-based false recognition in the single related item condition, 
participants overwhelmingly chose the correct target rather than the related foil when 
given the option to do so. This finding indicates that the detail distinguishing targets and 
related foils was not lost and could be retrieved under appropriate conditions. Experiment 
2 investigated the role of two distinct mechanisms that could have contributed to the 
initial results: (i) attention to detail and (ii) reinstatement of detail. The results of the 
second experiment suggest that the outcome of the first experiment was driven by 
reinstatement, not attention. These results suggest that retrieval failure is a major factor 
contributing to gist-based false recognition. The details are, to a large extent, still stored 
in memory. A critical factor determining whether false recognition will occur is whether 
the details can be accessed during retrieval. 
Our findings are consistent with laboratory experiments on eyewitness 
identification of suspects in lineups. When the culprit is not present in the line up, rates of 
mistaken identification are typically high. However, when the culprit is present, 
participants often choose the culprit correctly (Wells & Olson, 2003). Although research 
on mistaken eyewitness identification has generally proceeded independently of research 
on gist-based false recognition, the present results raise the possibility that there are 
strong parallels between these two types of memory errors and that retrieval failure, in 
particular, is a common mechanism contributing to both phenomena. False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   14 
These results offer an interesting contrast to findings obtained using the well-
known Deese-Roediger McDerrmott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
Mcdermott, 1995). In this paradigm, participants study a series of associatively related 
words that are all forward associates of a critical word that was not studied. The standard 
finding is that people falsely recognize the critical non-studied word very frequently. 
Schacter, Israel, & Racine (1999) modified the paradigm by presenting a picture with 
each studied word that depicted what the word named (see also Israel & Schacter, 1997). 
Participants that studied the pictures showed substantially lowered false recognition rates, 
relative to participants that didn’t study the pictures. Schacter et al. (1999) concluded that 
participants in the picture condition expected to recollect distinctive pictorial content and 
demanded access to that content in order to classify a word as “old”, thereby allowing 
them to reject related lures words that did not elicit the expected distinctive information; 
Schacter et al. (1999) termed this process the distinctiveness heuristic (see also Dodson & 
Schacter, 2002; Gallo, Weiss, & Schacter, 2004). In contrast to the present findings, work 
on the distinctiveness heuristic suggests that under some circumstances, people can 
strategically attend to perceptual information to reduce gist-based false recognition. A 
critical difference is that, when using the distinctiveness heuristic, retrieval of any 
pictorial information is sufficient to classify an item as “old”. The distinctiveness 
heuristic requires that people retrieve some sort of distinctive content, but it does not 
require that the content is highly detailed. In the current experiment, participants must 
retrieve enough detail to distinguish a target and a related foil. The difficulty of 
reconstructing this specific visual detail in the absence of the target object contributes to 
the robustness of gist-based false recognition. False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   15 
More generally, our findings are consistent with the widely acknowledged fact 
that false memories are affected by the circumstances at retrieval. With encoding and 
retention held constant, false memories can be reduced by factors at retrieval, particularly 
manipulations that encourage participants to monitor contextual details, as has been 
emphasized in discussion of the source monitoring framework (Dodson & Schacter, 
2002; Johnson, 1997; Johnson, et al., 1993; Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997). The 
current results suggest that, in addition to these previously demonstrated retrieval factors, 
the failure to retrieve detailed information that is still available in memory is a major 
contributor to gist-based false recognition.  
Our conclusions also have much in common with Fuzzy Trace Theory (Brainerd 
& Reyna, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). According to that model, people encode two 
independent types of traces: gist traces are semantic abstractions and tend to produce 
false recognition (as well as true recognition); verbatim traces contain specific details and 
support true recognition. It is proposed that verbatim traces are forgotten more rapidly 
than gist traces, thereby producing such phenomena as gist-based false recognition. 
However, the model also allows for cue-based retrieval effects. It is postulated that 
presentation of a target tends to elicit retrieval of a verbatim trace whereas presentation of 
a related lure tends to elicit retrieval of a gist trace. This notion of differential access to 
detail depending on the cue information presented to the participant is consistent with our 
interpretation of the present results. However, rather than focusing on the distinct 
properties of verbatim and gist traces, we emphasize the role of retrieval cues in 
providing access to information that is available in memory (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966; False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   16 
Tulving & Thompson, 1973) and that can be used under appropriate conditions to avoid 
gist-based false recognition. 
Although these results clearly suggest that retrieval failure is a major factor in 
gist-based false recognition, it is probably not the only factor. Gist-based false 
recognition was dramatically reduced in the target and related items condition, but it was 
not completely eliminated. Even these residual gist-based false memories could be 
attributable, in part, to retrieval failure: it is in principle possible that the provision of still 
more cue information, such as reinstatement of the precise study context (Smith & Vela, 
2001) or the temporal ordering of studied items (Jacoby, 1972), could reduce the rate of 
gist-based false alarms further. Nonetheless, it is plausible that the impressive degree of 
detail stored in memory is not without bound. Our contention is not that loss of detail 
from memory plays no role whatsoever, but rather that it plays a smaller role than has 
been previously assumed. In contrast, retrieval failure plays a larger role in generating 
gist-based false recognition than has been acknowledged to date. 
Our results raise the prospect that memory distortions may be avoided by 
improving the accessibility of information that is still stored in memory. Thus, a pressing 
avenue for future research is to determine the extent to which similar retrieval failure 
mechanisms apply to other laboratory demonstrations of false memory, such as 
imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Goff & Roediger, 
1998), DRM false recognition (Gallo, 2006; Miller & Wolford, 1999; Roediger & 
Mcdermott, 1995; Weinstein, McDermott, & Chan, 2010), and memory conjunction 
errors (Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992). Further investigation of the role of retrieval 
failure in producing false memories is likely to help us understand more fully how a False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   17 
system capable of impressive levels of retention, and which in daily life often serves us 
well, is also capable of error and distortion (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 
1995; Schacter, 1999). False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   18 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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. Recognition test conditions in Experiment 1. The participant’s task was to 
select one of the three items as old (studied) or reject all three items as new. The correct 
response is to select the silver anchor when it is present and reject all three items when it 
is not. See Rationale and Design. 
Figure 2. Accuracy data from Experiment 1. The color of each bar indicates the 
participant’s choice. In the examples provided in Figure 1, the scissors, bulldozers, and 
beavers are examples of paired unrelated foils. The apple and diskette are examples of 
single unrelated foils. Error bars show SEM. 
Figure 3. Eye tracking data from Experiment 1. The color of each bar indicates the 
participant’s choice. We exclude incorrect responses (with the exception of false alarms 
to related foils in the single related item condition) because these occurred infrequently 
and are associated with high estimation error and missing data values for certain 
participants. Error bars show SEM. 
Figure 4. Recognition test conditions in Experiment 2. The task is the same as 
Experiment 1 (cf. Figure 1), except for the inclusion of the two related items condition. 
Figure 5. Accuracy data from Experiment 2. The color of each bar indicates the 
participant’s choice. In the examples provided in Figure 4, the piggybanks, cats, and 
pretzels are examples of paired unrelated foils. The basketball, accordion, and cow 
are examples of single unrelated foils. Error bars show SEM. 
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Figure 6. Eye tracking data from Experiment 2. The color of each bar indicates the 
participant’s choice. We exclude incorrect responses (with the exception of false alarms 
to related foils in the single related item condition and the two related items condition) 
because these occurred infrequently and are associated with high estimation error and 
missing data values for certain participants. Error bars show SEM.False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   25 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ONLINE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS 
Stimulus Counterbalancing 
Experiment 1. On each trial of the recognition test, two pairs were used to 
generate the array. One of the pairs was used to produce the two related items and one of 
the pairs was used to produce the third item (in which case only one of the exemplars in 
the pair was presented). Thus, with four conditions, there were eight possible assignments 
of any particular pair. The object pairs were counterbalanced across all eight possible 
assignments. Then, exemplars serving as targets were further counterbalanced, for a total 
of 16 iterations of the counterbalancing. This process was repeated to produce a sample 
size of 32. 
Experiment 2. The counterbalancing method used in Experiment 1 was extended 
to five conditions and three exemplars. With five conditions there were 10 possible 
assignments of each triplet. Additionally, counterbalancing across three exemplars led to 
30 iterations of the counterbalancing. 
Eye Tracking 
  Eye tracking data were collected using an EyeLink 1000 MRI compatible eye 
tracking system (SR Research Ltd, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada). The pupil and corneal 
reflection were identified using automated thresholding. The pupil was modeled as an 
ellipse. For calibration, 9 fixation targets in an equally spaced grid covering the entire 
stimulus display were presented in a random order. The accuracy of the calibration was 
validated by presenting an additional 8 fixation targets at new locations on the display as 
well as the center of the display. The average measured error across the validation points False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   32 
was typically less than .5° for each participant. Validation was conducted before each 
block; calibration was rerun as necessary. Monocular data were collected at 1000 Hz. 
Saccades and fixations were detected online by the EyeLink software using the default 
thresholds (Stampe, 1993). 
SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS 
Experiment 1 Reaction Time. 
Reaction time data from Experiment 1 are presented in Supplementary Table 1. 
Reaction times were obtained by calculating the median reaction time for each participant 
and then averaging across participants. Two findings are noteworthy. First, gist-based 
false recognition in the single related item condition was associated with longer reaction 
times (2031 ms, SEM = 45) than veridical recognition in the baseline target condition 
[1833 ms, SEM = 34, t(31) = 5.63, p < .001]. Second, reaction times associated with hits 
were longer in the target and related item condition (2180 ms, SEM = 76) than in the 
baseline target condition [1833 ms, SEM = 34, t(31) = 5.72 p < .001]. 
Experiment 2 Reaction Time 
Reaction time data from Experiment 2 are reported in Supplementary Table 2. 
Reaction times associated with false alarms to related items in the two-related items 
condition were longer (2680 ms, SEM = 86) than in the single related item condition 
[2313 ms, SEM = 74, t(29) = 6.30, p < .001]. 
Confidence Experiment 
  Methods. The procedure was identical to the main experiment except that a 
confidence scale appeared following each recognition response. Participants responded 
without a deadline on a four point scale, with 1 labeled “very uncertain”, 2 labeled False Recognition & Retrieval Failure   33 
“somewhat uncertain”, 3 labeled “somewhat certain”, and 4 labeled “very certain”. Eye 
tracking data were not collected. 30 participants (9 male; ages 18-27, mean 20) were run. 
Data from one participant was replaced due to poor performance (baseline false alarms 
greater than baseline hits). Two participants included in the dataset had corrected 
recognition (baseline hits minus baseline false alarms) that fell slightly below (.23) the 
exclusion criteria for the other experiments (.30). Their exclusion would not alter our 
conclusions. 
  Results. The accuracy data (Supplementary Table 3) and reaction time data 
(Supplementary Table 4). from the confidence experiment closely replicated those of 
the main experiment. The confidence data are reported in Supplementary Figure 1. 
Confidence in gist-based false alarms in the single related item condition was less (2.76, 
SEM = 0.07) than in veridical memories during the baseline target condition [3.45, SEM 
= 0.06, t(29) = 9.47, p < .001]. The effects of the attentional manipulation are more 
relevant. There was a small but reliable decrease in confidence associated with hits in the 
target and related item condition (3.28, SEM = 0.06, green bar) relative to the baseline 
target condition [3.45, SEM = 0.06, green bar, t(29) = 4.03, p < .001]. Similarly, there 
was a small but reliable decrease in confidence associated with false alarms to related 
foils in the two related items condition (2.47, SEM = 0.08, yellow bar) relative to the 
single related item condition [2.76, SEM = 0.07, yellow bar, t(29) = 4.80, p < .001]. 
Although rates of gist-based false recognition were not reduced in the two related items 
condition, this condition was associated with a modest reduction in confidence. 
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Supplementary Table 1. Reaction Times (ms) in Experiment 1. 
  Baseline Target  Baseline Foil 
Single Related 
Item 
Target & 
Related Item 
Target  1833 (34)  NA  NA  2180 (76) 
Related Foil  NA  NA  2031 (45)  Low N 
New  Low N  2550 (89)  2703 (103)  Low N 
Note. We exclude incorrect responses (with the exception of false alarms to related foils 
in the single related item condition) because these occurred infrequently and are 
associated with high estimation error and missing data values for certain participants. 
SEM in parentheses.  False Recognition & Retrieval 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Supplementary Table 2. Reaction Times (ms) in Experiment 2. 
 
Baseline 
Target 
Baseline Foil 
Single 
Related Item 
Two Related 
Items 
Target & 
Related Item 
Target  1963 (65)  NA  NA  NA  2105 (79) 
Related Foil  NA  NA  2313 (74)  2680 (86)  Low N 
New  Low N  2615 (102)  2761 (108)  2811 (99)  Low N 
Note. We exclude incorrect responses (with the exception of false alarms to related foils 
in the single related item condition and the two related items condition) because these 
occurred infrequently and are associated with high estimation error and missing data 
values for certain participants. SEM in parentheses.  
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Supplementary Table 3. Accuracy in the Confidence Experiment. 
 
Baseline 
Target 
Baseline 
Foil 
Single 
Related 
Item 
Two 
Related 
Items 
Target & 
Related 
Item 
Target  .73 (.03)  NA  NA  NA  .66 (.03) 
Related Foil  NA  NA  .31 (.02)  .37 (.02)  .08 (.01) 
Paired 
Unrelated Foil 
.06 (.01)  .13 (.02)  .11 (.02)  NA  NA 
Single 
Unrelated Foil 
NA  .08 (.01)  NA  .05 (.01)  .03 (.01) 
New  .19 (.02)  .76 (.04)  .55 (.04)  .55 (.03)  .21 (.02) 
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Supplementary Table 4. Reaction times (ms) in the Confidence Experiment. 
 
Baseline 
Target 
Baseline Foil 
Single 
Related Item 
Two Related 
Items 
Target & 
Related Item 
Target  2169 (50)  NA  NA  NA  2408 (74) 
Related Foil  NA  NA  2508 (74)  3003 (86)  Low N 
New  Low N  2619 (82)  2769 (83)  3245 (210)  Low N 
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Supplementary Figure 1. Confidence data from Experiment 2, collected in a separate 
group of 30 participants run outside the MRI environment. The color of each bar 
indicates the participant’s choice. We exclude incorrect responses (with the exception of 
false alarms to related foils in the single related item condition and the two related items 
condition) because these occurred infrequently and are associated with high estimation 
error and missing data values for certain participants. Error bars show SEM. 
 